Захист персональних даних на робочому місці від перехоплення пемв шляхом примусової активації HDCP

Abstract

This paper addresses the risk of information leakage from computer displays through compromising electromagnetic emanations (TEMPEST/Van Eck). We propose a practical “HDCP-for-Privacy” concept: instead of enabling HDCP only for DRM-protected video, the display link (HDMI/DisplayPort) is forced to stay encrypted during everyday office work (documents, web applications, email). We outline a passive interception model focused on interface cables and compare common video interfaces by reconstruction complexity. The implementation approach relies on OS-level control (Linux DRM/KMS contentprotection properties and Windows output-protection mechanisms) plus a lowcost USB indicator that provides immediate visual assurance of the HDCP state. Link encryption reduces correlation between emitted signals and pixel content at the cable level, raising the bar for practical TEMPEST attacks.